Spectre and Meltdown — the CPU leaks through speculation
Spectre and Meltdown showed that speculative execution — a performance feature in every modern CPU — leaves timing traces that leak memory across security boundaries in hardware.
Not yet scoped.
Why
The PoC studies the cache-timing side channel at concept level and why mitigations cost real performance, the case that some vulnerabilities are architectural, not bugs.
How it works
Not yet built.
Where it lands in Jayverse
Devnet: treat Spectre/Meltdown mitigation as a Cloud Run host assumption, not something Jayverse patches. Note in infra docs that node isolation for Devnet/Anvil relies on the cloud provider's speculative-execution mitigations.
Auditor: add "architectural, not a bug" as a category in security write-ups. When documenting what was checked and by which rule, distinguish a hardware-level side channel like this from an application-level vulnerability the team actually controls.
Key expressions
Words and phrases from this page worth keeping, with the Korean meaning and the sentence they come from.
Expression
뜻 · 쓰이는 자리
speculative execution
추측 실행(미리 예측해서 먼저 실행하는 CPU 기법) · "speculative execution — a performance feature in every modern CPU"
leave traces
흔적을 남기다 · "leaves timing traces that leak memory"
side channel
부채널(정상 경로가 아닌 우회 유출 통로) · "the cache-timing side channel"
leak across
경계를 넘어 새어나가다 · "leak memory across security boundaries in hardware"
architectural, not a bug
버그가 아니라 설계 자체의 문제 · "some vulnerabilities are architectural, not bugs"